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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Did the district court judge err in denying Mr. Dorton's
Motion to Set Aside Sentence, Judgment and Conviction?

IV

TEXT OP STATUTE

76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single
criminal episode—Included offenses.—(1) A defendant may be
prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses
arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act
of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish
offenses which may be punished in different ways under different
provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one
such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under any
such provision bars a prosecution under any other such provision.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included
in the offense charged but may not be convicted of both the offense
charged and the included offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than
all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense
charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy
or form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense
otherwise included therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a
lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury
with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis
for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and
convicting him of the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or
judgment, or an appellate court on appeal or certiorari, shall
determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction
for the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to
support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included
offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or
reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for the included
offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought
by the defendant.

v

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Case No. 890273-CA
Priority No. 2

HARVEY DORTON,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 19, 1982, a jury convicted
Defendant/Appellant, Harvey Dorton, of Aggravated Kidnapping,
Aggravated Robbery, and Aggravated Burglary.

On July 14, 1982, the

Honorable Bryant H. Croft, Judge, Third Judicial District Court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, entered judgment and conviction
(R. 285-6).

Defendant/Appellant Dorton timely appealed his

convictions to the Utah Supreme Court; on October 3, 1983, the
Supreme Court affirmed Mr. Dorton's convictions (R. 660). The Court
remitted the case to the Third Judicial District Court on
December 9, 1983 (R. 659).
On July 11, 1988, Defendant/Appellant filed pro se the
"Motion to Set Aside Sentence, Judgement (sic) and Commitment" at
issue in the instant appeal (R. 674) (see Addendum A).

On

August 24, 1988, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, Third Judicial
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, reappointed trial
counsel to represent Mr. Dorton at the hearing on the motion
(R. 690). The State submitted a memorandum in opposition to

Defendant's motion (R. 691), and the trial court held a hearing on
the motion on September 26, 1988 (R. 714). The trial court entered
its written order denying the motion on October 3, 1988 (R. 719).
This appeal arises out of the denial of Defendant/Appellant's Motion
to Set Aside Sentence, Judgment and Commitment (R. 719).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On December 23, 1980, at approximately 7:00 p.m., two
armed men wearing ski masks appeared in the kitchen of a house in
Murray, Utah, where Betty and John Thomas were living (R. 441, 443,
444, 464). .Garn Edwards was in the house babysitting his grandsons,
Chance Pellum and Johnny Thomas (R. 442-3).

The men indicated that

they wanted to find John Thomas (R. 444, 464, 486). The larger man
hit Mr. Edwards in the head with a revolver and fired a shot. Then,
Mr. Edwards and the larger man went upstairs to find Betty Thomas1
jewelry (R. 446).
The larger man did not take any jewelry.

He requested

that Mr. Edwards give him the money in his wallet and any other
valuables he had (R. 447). The pair then returned downstairs and
Mr. Edwards sat with his grandsons (R. 447, 448).
Later in the evening, at anywhere from 9:00 p.m. to
10:30 p.m., Betty Thomas returned home (R. 450, 490). One of the
men asked Betty to remove her jewelry and give it to him, which she
did (R. 451). Betty gave her son Johnny some medicine, then went
upstairs with the smaller man to prepare a bed for Johnny (R. 492,
495, 452, 455). The smaller man performed sexual intercourse and
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sodomy with Betty while the two were outside the presence of the
larger man and the three remaining persons.
Chance's mother, Barbara, arrived at about 11:00 p.m. and
was greeted at the door by both men (R. 496). Barbara and the
larger man then walked out to her car to get some cigarettes
(R. 454). Several people were waiting for Barbara in the car. A
few minutes after going outside, Barbara and the larger man returned
to the house, and the larger man told his companion that there were
people waiting in the car (R. 455, 457). The larger man then went
back outside and returned with Grant Davis and Kevin Taylor
(R. 457). Another person, Kimberley Pellum, had left (R. 458).
The men asked Grant Davis for his money, which he gave to
them (R. 458). The pair told all five people to lie on the floor,
then, at about 11:00 p.m. or 12:00 midnight, they left (R. 459).
The pair kept the ski masks on throughout the incident,
but the larger man raised his up to his nose to smoke a cigarette
(R. 460, 469, 485). Mr. Edwards tried to avoid looking at the men
and purposely did not want to get a good look at them out of fear
for himself and his grandchildren (R. 467). Nevertheless, at trial,
Mr. Edwards indicated that he nthought" Mr. Dorton might be the
taller of the two men (R. 462).
Mr. Dorton presented an alibi defense.

David Patch

testified that he saw Mr. Dorton in Wendover on the night of the
incident at about 12:00 midnight and had drinks with him (R. 342).
Dean Buldock testified that he saw Mr. Dorton in Wendover on the
night of the incident at about 10:30 p.m.
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The State's rebuttal

witness, Carl Freeman, testified that he saw Harvey Dorton in
Alpine, Utah at about 9:30 p.m. on the night of the incident
(R. 373).
The trial court granted Mr. Dorton's motion to dismiss
the charge of Aggravated Sexual Assault (R. 340). The jury
convicted Mr. Dorton of Aggravated Kidnapping, Aggravated Robbery,
and Aggravated Burglary (R. 424).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in denying Defendant/Appellant's
Motion to Set Aside Sentence, Judgment and Conviction.

Mr. Dorton

was convicted of three charges arising out of a single act during a
single criminal episode.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402

(1953 as amended), a defendant cannot be convicted of separate
offenses arising out of a single act nor can he be convicted of
multiple offenses which are lesser included offenses of one another.

ARGUMENT

POINT. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING
MR. DORTON TO MORE THAN ONE OF THE OFFENSES
CHARGED.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1952 as amended) allows the
State to prosecute a defendant only for separate offenses rising out
of a single criminal episode.

That statute provides in pertinent

part:
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76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of
single criminal episode—Included offenses.—(1)
A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal
action for all separate offenses arising out of a
single criminal episode; however, when the same
act of a defendant under a single criminal episode
shall establish offenses which may be punished in
different ways under different provisions of this
code, the act shall be punishable under only one
such provision; an acquittal or conviction and
sentence under any such provision bars a
prosecution under any other such provision.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an
offense included in the offense charged but may
not be convicted of both the offense charged and
the included offense. An offense is so included
when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same
or less than all the facts required to establish
the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation,
conspiracy or form of preparation to commit the
offense charged or an offense otherwise included
therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a
statute as a lesser included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after
verdict or judgment, or an appellate court on
appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there
is insufficient evidence to support a conviction
for the offense charged but that there is
sufficient evidence to support a conviction for an
included offense and the trier of fact necessarily
found every fact required for conviction of that
included offense, the verdict or judgment of
conviction may be set aside or reversed and a
judgment of conviction entered for the included
offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such
relief is sought by the defendant.
In State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983), the Utah
Supreme Court discussed the relationship of lesser included
offenses.

The court pointed out that while a defendant can be

convicted of an offense which is charged, he or she cannot also be
convicted of a lesser included offense of that offense. Id.
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In determining whether an offense is a lesser included of
some other offense, both a principal and secondary test must be
applied.

Under the principal test, the statutory elements of both

offenses are compared to see whether one of the offenses "is
established by proof of the same or less than all of the facts
required to establish the commission of the offense charged
Id.

..."

at 97.
The secondary test is required due to the multiple

variations inherent in some offenses.

The secondary test involves a

consideration by the court of the evidence "to determine whether the
greater-lesser relationship exists between the specific variations
of the crime actually proved at trial."

ixL

In Hill, the Court

held that Theft was a lesser included offense of Aggravated Robbery
and reversed the Theft conviction and vacated the sentence thereon.
See also State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 456 (Utah 1987) (Court reversed
Theft conviction where Theft was lesser included offense of
Aggravated Robbery); State v. Pitts, 728 P.2d 113, 115-16 (Utah
1986) (Theft is a lesser included offense of Burglary in this
context); State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1313-14 (Utah 1986)
(Aggravated Robbery is lesser included offense of First Degree
Murder under the circumstances).
In the instant case, the trial court erred in allowing
the conviction for more than one offense to stand.

Aggravated

Kidnapping is a lesser included offense of Aggravated Robbery since,
in all robberies, a person must be detained or restrained.
Aggravated Robbery under the circumstances of this case is a lesser
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included offense of Aggravated Burglary, which was charged as an
entry into a dwelling "with the intent to commit a theft, assault or
felony" (R. 18). Here, where the facts establish that the entry was
done with intent to commit a felony, the separate felony cannot also
sustain a conviction.

See Pitts, 728 P.2d at 115-6.

In the instant case, Defendant/Appellant was convicted of
committing one continuous act. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1953 as
amended) prohibits punishment for separate crimes based on a single
act.

Under the circumstances of this case, Mr. Dorton should have

been sentenced on only one of the first degree felonies arising out
of this single criminal episode.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Dorton respectfully requests
that this Court reverse the district court's denial of his Motion to
Set Aside Sentence, Judgment and Conviction and remand the case with
an order that the sentence on two of the charges be vacated and that
judgment and conviction on only a single charge arising out of this
criminal episode be entered.
(^

Respectfully submitted this

1#NN R.

day of June, 1989.

BROWN

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

-

7
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DELIVERED by
this
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ADDENDUM A

Harvey Dorton
Attorney Pro Se
Post Office Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

.<&

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
STATE OF UTAH
000O000

MOTION TO SET ASIDE SENTENCE/
JUDGEMENT AND COMMITMENT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff;
vs.

Criminal Case No. CR-81-310

HARVEY DORTON,
Defendant .
000O000

Comes now the Defendant, Harvey Dorton, by and
through himself, attorney pro se, and hereby requests this
Honorable Court to grant Defendant's motion to set aside
his prior sentence, judgement and commitment as prayed for,
and for the reasons as hereinafter submitted to this Court
for its consideration.
1. That on the 14th day of July, 1982, before the
Honorable Bryant H. Croft, appeared James S. Housley, the
attorney for the State of Utah, and the Defendant appeared
in person and by counsel, Lynn R. Brown.
2. That on the 14th day of July, 1982, the Court
held that the Defendant was found guilty by a jury in abstentia
of the offenses of aggravated burglary, a felony of the first
degree; aggravated kidnapping, a felony of the first degree;
and aggravated robbery, a felony of the first degree.

1

3. That the mandate of the Utah Code of Criminal

2

Procedures, 1987-1988, with respect to Section 76-1-402,

3

only allows for separate offenses arising out of single criminal

4

episode-included offenses as follows:

5
6
7
8
9
10

(1) A defendant may be prosecuted
in a single criminal action for all separate
offenses arising out of a single criminal
episode; however, when the same act of
a defendant under a single criminal episode
shall establish offenses which may be
punished in different ways under different
provisions of this code, the act shall
b£ punishable under only one provision;
an acquittal or conviction and sentence
under any such provision bars a prosecution
under any other such provison.

11
12
13
14
15

(2) Whenever conduct may establish
separate offenses under a single criminal
episode, unless the court otherwise orders
to promote justice, a defendant shall
not be subject to separate trials for
multiple offenses when:
[A] The offenses are within the
jurisdiction of a single court, and

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

[B] The offenses are known to the
prosecuting attorney at the time the
defendant is arraigned on the first information
or indictment.
(3) A defendant may be convicted
of an offense included in the offense
charged but may not be convicted of both
the offense charged and the included
offense. An offense is so included when:
[A] It is established by proof of
the same or less than all the facts required
to establish the commission of the offense
charged; or

24
25
26
27
28

[B] It constitutes an attempt, solicitation,
conspiracy, or form of preparation to
commit the offense charged or an offense
otherwise included therein; or
[C] It is specifically designated
by a statute as a lessor included offense.

(4) The court shall not be obligated to
charge the jury with respect to an included
offense unless there is a rational basis
for a verdict acquiting the defendant
of the offense charged and convicting
him of the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after
verdict of judgement/ or an appellate
court on 'appealor certiorari1/ shall
determine that there is insufficient
evidence to support a conviction for
the offense charged but that there is
evidence to support a conviction for
an included offense/ and the trier of
fact necessarily found every fact required
for conviction of that included offense,
the verdict or judgement of conviction
may be set aside or reversed and a judgement
of conviction entered for the included
offense, without necessity of new trial/
if such relief is sought by the defendant.
4. The Defendant submits the following criminal
ngs are in reference to the instant case present
is court for review:
(A) Wash. App. 1977. In ascertaining
existence of lessor included offense,
court must look for identity of elements
between two crimes/ as established mainly
by definitions of crimes in criminal
codes/ and often with reference to particular
evidentiary facts; to show that there
exists lessor included offense/ more
is usually required than showing that
two crimes are similar or that in proving
offense charged state inevitably proved
lessor offense. State v. Dennis/ 561
P. 2d 219/ 16 Wash. App. 939.
(B) Ariz. 1978. If a jury finds defendant
guilty of two charges arising from same
transaction and there are not sufficient
independant facts to support the elements
of both crimes/ trial judge should then
set aside the lessor conviction. A.R.S.
13-1641, in State v. Bowie/ 580 P. 2d
1282, 1190, 119 Ariz. 336.
(C) Ariz. 1977. Where separate acts
give rise to separate crimes, defendant

1||

2

6||

7,,

can be convicted of both crimes consistent
with statute prohibiting double punishment,
A.R.S. 13-1641 in State v. Arnold, 565
P. 2d 1282, 115 Ariz. 421
(D) Okl. Cr. 1970. A series of criminal
charges cannot be based on the same criminal
act or transaction; a single criminal
act cannot be split up or subdivided
into two or more distinct offenses and
prosecuted as such. 63 O.S. 1961, 451,
in Heldenbrand v. Mills, 476 P. 2d 375.

10

(E) Utah 1978. Though crimes of robbery
and kidnapping arose out of same criminal
episode, conviction of defendant for
both offenses was prohibited by statute.
U.C.A. 1953, 76-1-401, 76-1-402, 76-1-402(1)
in State v. Eichler, 584 P. 2d 861.

11

5« That the Utah Supreme Court held the following

8||
9||

12
13||

14

in State v. Hill, case number 18180, on November 1, 1983:
STATE of Utah/ Plaintiff and
Respondent/

15
16

Wendell Irving HILL/ Defendant
and Appellant.

17

No. 18180

18

Supreme Court of Utah

19

Nov. 1, 1983.

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Defendant was convicted in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Christine
M. Durham, J., of theft and aggravated
robbery, and defendant appealed, challenging
conviction and sentence for theft. The
Supreme Court, Oaks, J., held that under
circumstances of case, crime of theft
was lesser included offense of aggravated
robbery.
Conviction of theft reversed, and
sentence thereon vacated; and all other
respects, affirmed.

1. Criminal Law - 29
Conviction of lesser included offense
is permitted as alternative to charged
offense, but is not permitted as addition
to it.
2. Criminal Law - 29/ 984(2)
Where two crimes are such that greater
could not be committed without necessarily
having committed lesser, then as a matter
of law they stand in relationship of
greater and lesser offenses, and defendant
cannot be convicted or punished for both.
3. Criminal Law - 29, 984(2)
In order to determine if defendnt
can be convicted and punished for two
different crimes committed in connection
with single criminal episode, court must
consider evidence to determine whether
greater-leser relationship exists between
specific variations of crimes actually
proved at trial.
4. Indictment and Information - 191(9)
Where only evidence before jury
showed compelted robbery, with property
taken from person of manager by use of
firearm, and crime of theft as part of
that same criminal episode, crime of
theft was lesser included offense of
aggravated robbery.
5. Criminal Law - 886
When defendant has been improperly
convicted of both greater and lesser
offense, it is appropriate to regard
conviction on leser offense as mere surplusage, which does not invalidate conviction and sentence on greater offense.

Brooke C. Wells of Salt Lake Legal
Defender Ass'n, Salt Lake City, for defendant
and appellant.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen.,
Robert N. Parrish, Asst. Atty. Gen.,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.

OAKS, Justice:
This case turns on whether theft
is a lesser included offense of aggravated
robbery on the facts of this case.
[1] The relationship of leser included
offenses is significant for two purposes.
"A defendant [1] may be convicted of
an offense charged [2] but may not be
convicted of both the offense charged
and the included offense." U.C.A., 1953,
76-1-402(3). In other words, conviction
of a lesser included offense (1) is permitted
as an alternate to the charged offense,
but (2) is not permitted as an addition
to it. This case involves the second
issue—conviction and sentence for theft
in addition to aggravated robbery.
The prosecution's evidence showed
that defendant and a companion forced
their way into the manager's apartment
at the Stratford Hotel in downtown Salt
Lake City. Defendant held a pistol.
After threatening to kill the manager
and a guest, the intruders bound and
gagged the two occupants. They took
a tape recorder, a TV, several items
of radio equipment, and about $70 in
cash from a desk. A few minutes later,
defendant and his companion were arrested
several blocks away in an automobile
containing some currency, all the items
taken from the apartment, and the pistol
used in the crime. As a result of this
episode, defendant was charged with and
convicted of four crimes, including aggravated
robbery of the manager and theft from
the manager. The court sentenced defendant
to 5 years to life on aggravated robbery
and to a concurrent lesser sentence on
theft. On appeal, defendant challenges
Only the conviction and sentence for
theft, contending that it is improper
in addition to the conviction for aggravated
robbery because theft is a lesser included
offense of aggravated robbery.
We conclude that for purposes of
the prohibition against conviction "of
both the offense charged and the included
offense," 76-1-402(3), the greater-lesser
reslationship must be determined by comparing
the statutory elements of the two crimes

as a theoretical matter and, where necessary,
by reference to the facts proved at trial.
[2] The principal test involves
a comparison of the statutory elements
of each crim. Subsection 76-1-402(3)(a)
provides the definition of leser included
offenses that is applied for this purpose:
an offense is lesser included when fl[i]t
is established by proof of the same or
less than all the facts required to establish
the commission of the offense charged . . ."
Thus, where the two crimes are "such
that the greater cannot be committed
without necessarily having committed
the lesser," State v. Baker, Utah, 671
P. 2d 152, 156 (1983), then as a matter
of law they stand in the relationship
of greater and lesser offenses, and the
defendant cannot be convicted or punished
for both. So it is with robbery and
theft, which are generally acknowledged
to occupy the greater-lesser relationship.
State v. Elliott, Utah, 641 P. 2d 122,
123 (1982); People v. Cole, 31 Cal. 3d
568, 582, 645 P. 2d 1182, 1191, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 350, 359 (1982).
[3] The secondary test is required
by the circumstance that some crimes
have multiple variations, so that a greaterlesser relationship exists between some
variations of these crimes, but not between
others. E.g., State in Interest of L.G.W.,
Utah, 641 P. 2d 127, 130-31 (1982) (forcible
sexual abuse and lewdness). A theoretical
comparison of the statutory elements
of two crimes having multiple variations
will be insufficient. In order to determine
whether a defendant can be convicted
and punished for two different crimes
committed in connection with a single
criminal episode, the court must consider
the evidence to determine whether the
greater-lesser relationship exists between
the specific variations of the crimes
actually proved at trial. The multiple
variations of the crime of aggravated
robbery involved in this case show why
this is necessary.
Aggravated robbery is committed
by using a firearm in one of three circumstances: "[1] in an attempt to commit,
[2] during the commission of, or [3] in

the immediate fight after the attempt
or commission of a robbery." 76-6-302(1)
and (3). As the district court concluded,
according to a theoretical comparison
of the statutory elements of each crime/
theft is not a lesser included offense
of aggravated robbery because theft is
not "established by proof of the same
or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of [one variation
of] the offense charged." 76-1-402(3)(a).
This is because the obtaining or exercising
of unauthorized control over the property
of another (an element of theft) is not
an element of the first variation of
aggravated robbery (use of a gun in an
attempt to commit a robbery). In contrast/
the greater-lesser relationship does
exist between theft and the second variation
o£ aggravated robbery (use of a gun during
the commission of a robbery).
[4] In this case, the only evidence
before the jury showed a completed robbery,
with property taken from the person of
the manager by use of a firearm, and
the crime of theft as part of that same
criminal episode. As to this variation
of aggravated robbery, the crime of theft
is a lesser included offense. Consequently/
on the facts of this case, 76-1-402(3)
clearly bars,this defendant's being convicted
and punished for theft in addition to
aggravated robbery.
[5] When a defendant has been improperly
convicted of both a greater and a lesser
offense, it is appropriate to regard
the conviction on the leser offense as
mere surplusage, which does not invalidate
the conviction and sentence on the greater
offense. United States v. Howard, 507
F. 2d 559 (8th Cir. 1974).
The conviction for theft is reversed,
and the sentence thereon is vacated.
In all other respects, the judgements
of conviction and the related sentences
are affirmed.
HALL, C.J., STEWART AND HOWE, JJ.,
and ERNEST F. BALDWIN, Jr., District
Judge, concur.
DURHAM, J., having disqualified

a

r*iy

herself/ does not participate herein;
ERNEST F. BALDWIN/ Jr., District Judge,
sat.

6. The Defendant submits that other state courts
in favor of defendants when charged with multiple
ising out of the same criminal episode:
(A) Alaska 1985. Four factors to consider
in deciding whether statute describes
single offense or multiple offenses are:
Language of statute itself,
Legislative history,
Nature of proscribed conduct/
And appropriateness of multiple
punishment for conduct charged in indictment.
SEE: State v. James, 698 P. 2d 1161.
(B) Utah 1986. Theft was lesser included
offense of aggravated robbery/ and therefore,
conviction and sentence for theft, after
defendant was convicted of aggravated
robbery, were improper. U.C.A. 1953,
76-1-402(3), in State v. Shaffer, 725
P. 2d 1301.
(C) Utah 1983. Conviction of lesser
included offense is permitted as alternative
to charged offense, but is not permitted
in addition to it. SEE: State v. Hill,
674 P. 2d 96.
(D) Utah 1980. The general test as to
whether there are separate offenses or
one offense is whether the evidence discloses
one general intent or discloses separate
and distinct intents; the particular
facts and circumstances determine this
question.
If there is but one intention,
One general impulse, and
One general plan,
Even though there is a series of transactions
there is but one offense. SEE: State
v. Kimbel, 620 P. 2d 515.
^ <~r
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CONCLUSION
THEREFORE, in conclusion of the facts as set forth

3

above, the Defendant prays that this Honorable Court will

4

grant said motion filed herein, and to furthermore set aside

5

all previously entered orders of judgement, sentence and

6]| commitment of the Defendant.

And finally, to resentence

the Defendant to only one of the offenses of either aggravated
8

robbery, a felony of the first degree, or aggravated burglary,

9

a felony of the first degree, or aggravated kidnapping, a
ony of the first degree, as prescribed by law and set

11 I forth in the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, 1988.

12|.
13
14 I

DATED on this

day of July, 1988.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
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"flARVEY^CORTON/Defendant
Attorney Pro Se
Post Office Box 250
Draper, Utah
84020
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1/ Harvey Dorton, Defendant above named, hereby
certify that I have mailed a true and correct photocopy of

4II the foregoing MOTION TO SET ASIDE SENTENCE, JUDGEMENT AND
5ll COMMITMENT, postage prepaid, to the following on this
6 | day of July, 1988
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8| |
9||
10||
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13||

(1) DAVID YOOKUM
Salt Lake County Attorney
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office
431 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
(2) LYNN BROWN
Attorney at Law
c/o Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association
333 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
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MARVEY/DORTONTDefendant
Attorney Pro Se
Post Office Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
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TED. CANNON
Salt Lake County Attorney
By: ROGER S. BLAYLOCK
Deputy County Attorney
431 South 300 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: 363-7900
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH

)

Plaintiff

)
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT

vs

)
)

4ARVEY DORTON

)
Defendant

Case No. CR-81-310

)

On the 14th day of July, 1982, before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft,
ippeared James S.

Housley,

the attorney for the State of Utah, and the

lefendant appeared in person and by counsel, Lynn R. Brown.
The Court having asked if the defendant has anything to say why
idgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary
eing shown or appearing to the Court,
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant is guilty of the offenses of
.ggravated Burglary, a, first degree felony;
egree felony;

Aggravated Kidnapping, a first

and Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony.

IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant be confined and imprisoned at the
tah State Prison for the indeterminate term of not less than five years and
hich may be for life, and is not fined as provided by law for the crime of
ggravated Burglary; and that the defendant be confined and imprisoned at the
tah State Prison for the indeterminate term of not less than five years and
hich may be for life and is not fined as provided by law for the crime of
jqravated Kidnapping; and that the defendant be confined and imprisoned at
e Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term of not less than five years and
lich may be for life and is not fined as provided by law for the crime of
jgravated

Robbery.

ayed for 10 days.

Said sentences

shall

run

concurrently.

Commitment

IT IS ORDERED that N. D. Hay ward, Sheriff of Salt Lake County,
of Utah, take the said defendant, Harvey Dorton, and deliver said
iant without delay to the Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, where said
iant shall then and there be confined and imprisoned in accordance with
udgment and Commitment.
DATED this %\>

day of July, 1982.
BY THE COURT

ft

f

Bryant H./Croft, Judge

-AA

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 77-18-5, Utah Code Annotated,
as amended 1980, and in accordance with the guidelines developed
intly between the Courts and the Board of Pardons, I recommend that the
idant serve

$ffi*

lo 0

months prior to release or parole.

Imprisonment is ordered in deviation from the guidelines because:

Comments, including mitigating or aggravating circumstances:
^O^ut t^iA/jr^/vY^

3 -tAj^r

ckjjfrj&L fU^r^y

CJL-*-£<?

L

^-

^h-cH^.

BY THE COURT

gdff^t/i. Crott, Judge

AT T _ _
W. STERLING EVAN;
rtERK'
-BY

W^"

